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This paper examines the structure of the American medical care system, 
focusing primarily on the system of care for the elderly. Understanding the 
design of medical care systems is important for several reasons. First, we 
frequently want to know how to compare systems across countries. Is the 
American medical care system closer to the European model or the Japan- 
ese model? How different are the medical systems across continental Eu- 
ropean countries? To answer these questions, we need to characterize the 
systems themselves. 
We are also interested in medical system structure because we want to  re- 
late structures to outcomes. Is the longer life expectancy in Japan than in 
the United States attributable to the Japanese medical system, or to other 
factors? Which country has the better medical care system? Understand- 
ing how medical systems work is the key to starting. 
Medical care systems are multidimensional, and so our description must 
be as well. The basis for our analysis is the medical care triad, presented in 
figure 2.1.'  There are three participants in the medical care system: pa- 
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1. Figure 2.1 is not new to us. The distinction between coverage, reimbursement, and access 
is common in the literature. See, for example, Reinhardt (2004), Evans (2002), and Cherni- 
chovsky (1995). 
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Fig. 2.1  The medical care triad 
tients, providers, and insurers. Patients pay money to insurers (either di- 
rectly or indirectly, as we discuss in the following) and pay for some care di- 
rectly. Insurers reimburse providers for care and set rules under which the 
care can be provided. Providers diagnose and treat patients. 
Corresponding to these three participants are three sets of interactions. 
The first is the coverage rules. This encompasses the mechanisms by which 
people get health insurance and who pays for that insurance. The second 
interaction is the reimbursement system between insurers and providers- 
how is payment determined and what rates are paid? Finally, there are the 
access rules-which  providers are patients allowed to see and under what 
circumstances? In this paper, we  describe the insurance, reimbursement, 
and access rules in the American medical care system. The paper can be 
compared with the work of Yashiro, Suzuki, and Suzuki (chap. 1 in this vol- 
ume), who analyze the Japanese medical system in a similar framework. 
We present broad outlines of the system for everyone in the United States. 
Because the system is so heterogeneous, we focus particular attention on 
the system for the elderly. We note where research has explored a link be- 
tween system provisions and outcomes, but we do not take the further step 
of relating system provisions to health outcomes in any systematic way. 
We begin in section 2.1 by presenting a brief overview of medical systems 
in developed countries. We show the large differences in medical spending 
and health outcomes across countries that motivate our desire to make sys- 
tem comparisons. Section 2.2 discusses the methods through which Amer- 
icans get insurance coverage and the flow of money. Section 2.3 highlights 
the reimbursement arrangements that providers operate under, and section 
2.4 presents the access rules for patients and providers. We end with a brief 
conclusion. 
2.1  The International Experience 
The performance of medical care systems differs enormously  across 
countries. To give a summary of this performance, we emphasize two di- The U.S. Medical Care System for the Elderly  45 
mensions most relevant for economic analysis: how much the system costs 
and how healthy people are, perhaps as a result of the medical system.2 
To measure costs, we look at medical spending as a share of gross do- 
mestic product  (GDP). Gross domestic product  is  a natural  scalar  by 
which to evaluate medical care; a richer country should spend more on 
medical care than a poorer country. In principle, a more accurate scalar 
would be the amount of medical spending that is expected, given the in- 
come elasticity of medical care. That elasticity is not known, however. In 
microdata, the elasticity of medical spending with respect to income is far 
below 1, generally about .2 (Newhouse 1993). This suggests that we should 
look at per capita spending more than spending relative to GDP. This 
comparison, however, presumes that prices are constant across countries 
at a point in time. In fact, medical prices rise with income (Baumol 1967). 
In macroregressions, the income elasticity is usually somewhat above 1 
(Getzen 2000). But that is likely overstated, as it reflects demand as well as 
technology conditions. There is no obvious scalar, so we focus on the GDP 
comparison. 
Figure 2.2 shows medical spending as a share of GDP in Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The data 
are for 1998, the most recent year in which they are complete. The United 
States spends the most of any country on medical care, nearly 14 percent 
of GDP. The next highest country, Switzerland, spends only 11 percent of 
GDP on medical care. Among high income countries, the United King- 
dom is a very low outlier, spending only 7 percent of GDP on medical care. 
The average in the OECD is about 8 percent. 
To measure health, we use life expectancy at birth. Life expectancy is the 
most common summary of health in the literature. In using this indicator, 
we emphasize immediately that it is influenced by far more than medical 
care. Life expectancy is affected by lifestyle factors (smoking, diets), envi- 
ronmental conditions (air pollution), and other economic and social fac- 
tors. Our purpose here is not to grade medical systems. Rather, we want to 
illustrate the range of variation in the data. 
Life expectancy in OECD countries is shown in figure 2.3. Once again, 
there is wide variation. The mean across developed countries is seventy- 
seven years. The United States, although with a life expectancy of seventy- 
seven years (equal to the mean), ranks twenty-first of the thirty countries 
shown in the figure. Japan is the clear positive outlier, with life expectancy 
of eighty-one years. 
Comparing figures 2.2 and 2.3 suggests little correlation between med- 
ical spending and life expectancy. Figure 2.4 shows this explicitly. The hor- 
2. Other dimensions of performance include the degree to which the system treats people 
fairly and the extent to which it upholds normative values of right and wrong. We are less able 









Fig. 2.2  Medical spending as a share of GDP 
Source: OECD (2002). 
izontal axis of figure 2.4 is medical spending as a share of GDP. The verti- 
cal axis is life expectancy. A regression line indicates a positive relation be- 
tween the two, although this is driven primarily by  the very low income 
countries (Turkey, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic). Among higher in- 
come countries,  there is no relation between spending and health  out- 
comes. 
As we indicated in the preceding, we do not interpret this result as sug- 
gesting that the marginal value of medical care is low. That may be the case, 
but it is not proven by this comparison. Rather, the comparison illustrates 
the need to explore the issue further. What role do medical systems play in 
influencing these outcomes? Do system features relate to performance? 
The remaining sections of the paper start down this path. 
2.2  Insurance Coverage in the United States 
There is no single health care system in the United States. Rather, health 
insurance in the United States is provided through a mixture of public and 
private programs. The principal public plans are Medicare, which provides 
insurance for the elderly and some disabled nonelderly, and Medicaid, 
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(on a means-tested basis), the blind and disabled, and long-term care for 
persons age sixty-five and older. Employer-provided plans are the principle 
source of insurance for the nonelderly. We focus on the medical system for 
the elderly, but we begin by describing how insurance for the elderly fits 
into the total health care system. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the sources of insurance coverage. We tabulate sta- 
tistics separately for the nonelderly population (below age sixty-five) and 
the elderly. The source of care is presented in the left column of the table. 
Within each age group, we show the share of people with that source of in- 
surance coverage and total spending for that age group accounted for by 
that source. Spending includes all medical services, with one exception: 
most long-term care spending is  not accounted for in these data (most 
people in nursing homes are not in the spending sample). This reduces the 
share of spending for the elderly that is accounted for by Medicaid and out- 
of-pocket payments, but we do not have an easy way of adding that back in. 
Public insurance covers 97 percent of the elderly population and about 
Table 2.1  Sources of health insurance and medical spending in the United States 
Under age 65  Age 65 and over 
Nature of  Yo  of  Yn of  Nature of  Yo  of  '% of 
Source coverage population payments coverage population payment:s
Public insurance 
Medicare  Disabled 





Employer  Workers and 
dependants 
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Sources: Coverage data are from the Current Population Survey, March 2002. Spending data are fromm 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Study, 1997. 
"Out-of-pocket spending 
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16 percent of the nonelderly population. Medicare is the dominant public 
program for the elderly, while Medicaid is more important for the non- 
elderly. The majority of the nonelderly, nearly three-quarters, are covered 
by private insurance. Most of this is provided through employment, but 
a significant share comes from individual purchase as well. The quality of 
this coverage varies by employer. 
Sixteen percent of the nonelderly population is without health insurance, 
compared to less than 1 percent for the elderly. In total, 46 million Ameri- 
cans are uninsured. The uninsured are a heterogenous group. Some are 
young and perhaps feel that health insurance is not a pressing need, others 
are poor and don’t buy insurance, many are unemployed or employed by 
small firms that don’t provide insurance, still others have chronic diseases 
that prevent them from buying insurance. Some of the uninsured are eli- 
gible for Medicaid3  but don’t use the insurance. Many of the uninsured receive 
care through hospital emergency rooms. Much of this care is for serious ill- 
ness or accidents, providing a sort of partial catastrophic insurance paid for 
by insured patients who pay more than the price of their care. 
The share of medical spending paid for by various sources of insurance is 
shown in the next columns of table 2.1. In total, 35 percent  of  medical 
spending is for the elderly (the elderly make up about 13 percent of the pop- 
ulation). At the time care is received, payment for the elderly comes from six 
sources-Medicare,  Medicaid, privately purchased  Medigap insurance, 
employer-provided retiree health insurance, out-of-pocket payments, and 
other miscellaneous sources. Medicare is the dominant payer, accounting 
for 58 percent of total spending. Including both Medicare and Medicaid 
payments, government programs pay for nearly two-thirds of the medical 
bills of the elderly. (The share would be somewhat lower if long-term care 
spending were included.) Private insurance and out-of-pocket payments ac- 
count for the bulk of the remainder, in roughly equal proportions. 
A large proportion  of out-of-pocket payments are for outpatient pre- 
scription  drugs.  In addition,  much  long-term care  spending is out of 
pocket, although these expenses are undercounted in this table. 
In the nonelderly population, about 50 percent of medical payments are 
made by private insurers. Government payments account for 17 percent of 
spending, and out-of-pocket spending by individuals accounts for another 
21 percent. 
2.2.1  Who Pays for Insurance? 
Inpatient insurance (Part A) under Medicare is paid for by the young 
through a 2.9 percent payroll tax-half  of which is paid for by the em- 
ployer and half by the employee. Outpatient care (Part B) under Medicare 
3.  About 40 percent of children who are uninsured are eligible for Medicaid, and additional 
children are eligible for coverage under the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). 50  David M. Cutler and David A. Wise 
is financed through Supplementary Medical Insurance. Enrollee premi- 
ums are 25 percent of the cost of the insurance. The remainder comes out 
of general government revenues. In addition, Medicare beneficiaries can 
buy Medigap private insurance to cover the difference between Medicare 
payments and charges for care. About two-thirds of Medicare beneficiar- 
ies are covered by a private insurance policy in addition to Medicare-half 
are employer-provided retiree plans and half are purchased individually. 
As we discuss in the following, together these plans provide first-dollar cov- 
erage for a large portion of care, encouraging excessive use of services 
(Newhouse 1993). 
Insurance premiums under employer-provided plans for the nonelderly 
are typically shared between the employer and the employee. On average, 
about 75 to 80 percent of premiums are paid for by the employer and the 
remainder by the employee. Unlike wages and salaries, compensation to 
employees in the form of health insurance is not taxed. Thus employees 
have a strong incentive to take compensation in the form of health insur- 
ance (Feldstein 1973).  And employees have a strong incentive to encourage 
generous insurance plans with low out-of-pocket copayments, which are 
typically taxed. Thus, for the under sixty-five group as well, part of the sys- 
tem pushes toward first-dollar coverage with little constraint on expendi- 
ture at the time care is received. 
The out-of-pocket bill facing individuals is the direct spending on med- 
ical care services plus the family cost of health insurance. These totals are 
not readily apparent in table 2.1, which records the payer at the time the 
service is used. To flow through these insurance payments to individuals, 
table 2.2 shows family spending on medical care. Among the elderly pop- 
ulation, insurance payments are about $1,800 per family (largely for sup- 
plemental  Medigap insurance coverage and the employee part of  em- 
ployer-sponsored retirement coverage), and direct costs are about the same 
magnitude. The amounts are similar in the nonelderly population, about 
$1,900 for direct payments and health insurance. 
In addition to these payments, the nonelderly also pay indirectly for the 
Table 2.2  Family payments for medical care (%) 
Source  Under 65  Over 65 
Direct  1,857  3,493 
Insurance payments  884  1,115 
Out-of-pocket  913  1,719 
Employer  2,651 
Total  4,508 
Sources: Direct spending is from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2001. Employer pay- 
ments are estimated assuming that three-quarters of insurance premiums are paid by  em- 
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employer’s portion of employer-provided health insurance. Though the 
employer writes the check for insurance, economic research establishes 
quite clearly that the ultimate incidence of these payments is on workers 
(Summers 1989; Gruber 1994). A rough guess of these amounts is about 
$2,700 per family. Spending on health insurance and medical care is thus 
perhaps $4,500 in total for the nonelderly population. 
The final set of payments are taxes to pay for public programs and the 
implicit income that retirees give up earlier in life to pay for employer- 
provided medical care when retired. The incidence of these payments by 
age is somewhat harder to assess. Previous taxes paid by  the elderly for 
Medicare do not cover their current use, for example, and so some of that 
cost is paid for by the current young. The same is likely true with employer- 
provided supplemental insurance. Rather than deal with these genera- 
tional incidence questions, however, we  limit ourselves to payments tar- 
geted to immediate services use. 
2.2.2  Gradations in Insurance Coverage 
To this point, we have treated all private health insurance as identical. In 
practice, there are enormous differences in the types of insurance that 
people have. The services covered by Medicare differ from those covered 
by Medicaid and private insurance. Table 2.3 shows this comparison. Pri- 
vate insurance policies generally cover hospital care, physician services, out- 
patient tests, and prescription drugs. Long-term care is usually not covered, 
but those services are used infrequently by the nonelderly population. 
Medicare is significantly  less generous than the typical private insurance 
policy. Medicare covers hospital services, physician expenses, and labora- 
tory tests. It does not cover outpatient prescription medications, however, 
and only very limited coverage for long-term care. Partly as a result of this, 
almost all elderly supplement Medicare in one form or another. As ex- 
plained previously, some beneficiaries purchase private Medigap policies 
to cover cost sharing and occasionally prescription drugs. Other benefici- 
aries obtain supplemental insurance from a former employer. Still others 
enroll in Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) to obtain 
additional services, a topic we  return to in the following. Finally, the poor 
Table 2.3  Typical coverage in insurance policies 
Private  Medicare  Medicaid 
Hospital  J  J  J 
Physician  J  J  J 
Laboratory  J  J  J 
Prescription medications  J  J 
Long-term care  Modest  J 52  David M. Cutler and David A. Wise 
No  Cot 
Retii  ‘ee 
Medigap 
Fig. 2.5  Prescription drug coverage among the elderly 
Note: Data are for 1998. 
elderly have prescription  drug and long-term care services paid for by 
Medicaid. 
Figure 2.5 shows the share of elderly with insurance coverage for pre- 
scription drugs and the source of that coverage. Three-quarters of the el- 
derly have prescription drug coverage. The bulk of such coverage is  ob- 
tained through prior employment, with HMOs, private Medigap policies, 
and other public programs supplying the remainder. 
Medicaid covers the range of acute and long-term care services. On pa- 
per, Medicaid is among the most generous insurance plans available. In 
practice, though, Medicaid payments are so tightly constrained that access 
to care for Medicaid beneficiaries is a significant concern. We do not focus 
greatly on the Medicaid program in the remainder of the paper. 
The Medicaid experience raises the broader point that access is not just 
about covered services. The nature of the insurance policy differs in other 
ways as well. A major issue in the United States is whether the receipt of 
medical care is managed. Managed care is a form of vertical integration in 
medicine. Rather than dividing insurance from medical care provision, 
managed care integrates the two, having insurers become involved in what 
care is provided and how it is delivered. Private insurance has a range of 
different types of management. We provide more details in the following, 
but note here that the system is more complex than table 2.3 suggests. 
There is some managed care in Medicare, but it is decidedly less impor- 
tant. About 90 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are in the traditional pro- 
gram, where the government determines the payment  rates and access 
rules. The remaining  10 percent are in managed care plans, usually an 
HMO. Because of the dominance of the traditional Medicare program, we 
refer to Medicare as if it were just that policy. The U.S. Medical Care System for the Elderly  53 
(Most generous)  (Least generous) 
Salary  Capitation 
Traditional Medicare, 
Private Insurance 
Medicare Physicians  Hospitals 
4-  Managed Care Physicians -b 
Fig. 2.6  Characterization of reimbursement systems 
2.3  Reimbursing Providers 
Given the many different ways that Americans obtain health insurance, 
it is not surprising that there is a wide range of reimbursement systems in 
use. Further, the reimbursement systems differ enormously in the incen- 
tives they pr~vide.~ 
Perhaps the most critical feature of reimbursement systems is the degree 
to which payments are related to costs. Some reimbursement systems pay 
more when more care is provided, and others pay less. Consider a linear re- 
lation between payment for a service provided and the various costs of that 
service: 
(1)  Payment = a + b . Practice Cost + c .  Time Cost, 
where a,  b, and c are parameters of the payment system. Practice costs in- 
clude office expenses, nonphysician administrative personnel, malpractice 
insurance, and supplies. The time costs represent the opportunity costs of 
the physician devoting additional hours to care. 
Historically, medical care in the United States was paid for on afee-for- 
service basis. In this system, total reimbursement is equal to the cost of care 
provided (with some division between insurer and enrollee payments. In 
terms of equation (I), a = 0, h = 1, and c = 1. Fee-for-service insurance is 
shown at one end of the scale of payment generosity in figure 2.6. 
There is a distinction between marginal and average cost that is impor- 
tant in understanding the incentives of fee-for-service systems. Medical 
care has very high fixed costs, but the marginal cost of additional produc- 
tion is often low. For example, it costs about $800 million to develop a new 
drug (DiMasi 2003), but the cost of producing additional pills once the 
4. For a review of physician payment systems and the incentive they create, see McGuire 
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drug is developed is only pennies. Similarly, many of the costs for a physi- 
cian are sunk costs-the  opportunity cost of medical education most par- 
ticularly. Other costs are fixed costs, depending only on the decision to 
practice medicine. Examples of these costs include malpractice insurance, 
office rent, and equipment overhead. True marginal cost is low. 
Traditional fee-for-service payment systems paid on the basis of average 
costs. This reimburses physicians for sunk and fixed costs as well as mar- 
ginal costs. In practice, this creates large profits for providing additional 
care because payment far exceeds costs at the margin. Thus, fee-for-service 
payment systems strongly encourage provision of medical care in almost 
all circumstances. 
A somewhat less generous set of incentives is provided by a salary sys- 
tem. In many HMOs in the United States and in some European countries, 
physicians are paid a salary for providing care. The salary system corre- 
sponds to  a payment rule where a >  0, b = 1, and c = 0. The physician earns 
a fixed amount of money and does not have to pay for any practice ex- 
penses but is not reimbursed more for additional time costs. 
The salary system provides fewer incentives  for care provision than does 
the fee-for-service  system. In a salary system, additional care provided is 
not reimbursed at the margin, so there is no financial incentive to do  more. 
In particular, because the doctor’s time cost is not reimbursed at the mar- 
gin, the doctor has an incentive to cut back on time inputs. A doctor on a 
salary earns the same amount if he shows up for a full day or half day of 
work (assuming his salary is not docked). Thus, doctors will attempt to ar- 
rive late and leave early and to substitute tests and devices for additional 
time. 
The ability of physicians to do this varies by setting. In some countries, 
such as Italy, monitoring of physicians is poor, and doctors routinely vio- 
late the guidelines as to hours that must be worked (Cutler 2002a). In many 
HMOs, in contrast, monitoring is stronger, and physicians are not able to 
shirk. 
The third type of payment system is capitation. In the extreme version of 
this system, physicians are paid a fixed amount and must pay for all care 
provided out of the capitation amount. In terms of equation (l),  a >  0, b = 
0, and c = 0. This type of system is most common with primary care physi- 
cians. If a patient of a doctor paid this way uses medications that the doc- 
tor prescribes or is admitted to the hospital, the costs of the medications or 
hospitalization are paid for out of the capitation amount. 
There are a complex array of capitation systems used in practice. Some 
physicians are capitated for care used in the primary setting, medications, 
and nonemergency hospitalizations, but not for emergency hospitaliza- 
tions. Others are capitated for all costs, but have reinsurance for very ex- 
pensive patients. Still others have varying degrees of capitation depending 
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Regardless of the specifics, capitated systems have the feature that physi- 
cian earnings are negatively related to the amount of care provided. Doc- 
tors that do more earn less. Not surprisingly, the incentives of this system 
are the weakest (as shown in figure 2.6). A purely profit maximizing doctor 
paid a capitation rate would not see patients at all and would not provide 
any care. Of course, HMOs monitor physician behavior, and patients will 
find other doctors if no care is provided, meaning that future income will 
decline. Thus, the example is grossly exaggerated. But it shows the nature 
of the incentives. 
In addition to varying across payers,  reimbursement  systems in the 
United States have changed over time. Figure 2.6 illustrates the evolution 
of these systems. Historically, both Medicare and private insurers reim- 
bursed services on a fee-for-service  basis. The reason for this was practical. 
When private insurers started to cover medical care, they did not know 
how to pay for care; medical care was separate from insurance. Doctors 
had list prices, however, and so insurers paid those prices. This ultimately 
turned into the fee-for-service system. 
Over time, both Medicare and the private sector have moved away from 
fee-for-service payment.  Medicare  currently  pays  physicians  on  a  fee 
schedule, based loosely on the estimated cost of  services provided. In a 
number of detailed studies, the government attempted to determine the 
cost of different services and now reimburses physicians on that basis. The 
payment is still per service performed, but is somewhat less generous than 
it once was. 
Bigger changes have occurred in the payment system for hospitals. Since 
the early 1980s, payment for Medicare patients admitted to hospitals has 
been under a partially capitated system termed the prospective payment 
system (PPS). When a Medicare patient is admitted to a hospital, the hos- 
pital reports the diagnosis the patient received and whether a surgical pro- 
cedure was performed. These two attributes are used to classify patients 
into one of about 470 diagnosis related groups (DRGs). The payment re- 
ceived for the patient depends only on the DRG and hospital factors, such 
as the region of the country and whether the hospital is a teaching hospi- 
tal, not the specific services provided (other than how the surgical or non- 
surgical distinction affects DRG coding). 
An example illustrates how this system works. Consider the treatment 
of patients with acute myocardial infarction, or heart attack (see Cutler 
and McClellan 1998). A patient with a heart attack will almost always be 
admitted to a hospital. Upon admission, the hospital will administer a 
number of medications, including aspirin, beta-blockers, and, potentially, 
thrombolytics. Under the old fee-for-service  payment system, each of these 
medications would be reimbursed separately. In the DRG system, there is 
no additional payment for providing them. 
Many patients with a heart attack receive cardiac catheterization, a di- 56  David M. Cutler and David A. Wise 
agnostic procedure that measures the extent of blood flow to the heart. 
Catheterization is a surgical procedure; hence patients receiving a cathe- 
terization will  be in a different DRG than patients who do not receive 
catheterization. The exact cost of the catheterization is not a factor in pay- 
ment; however, a hospital that takes longer for each catheterization will re- 
ceive no more money than a hospital that takes less time. 
Depending on the results of the catheterization, additional procedures 
may be performed. Bypass surgery is a procedure to reroute blood flow 
around the blocked area in the coronary arteries. Angioplasty is used to 
clear the original blockage and restore blood flow in the arteries. Each of 
these procedures moves the patient into a more highly reimbursed DRG. 
But the specifics of the services provided-the  type of catheter, the num- 
ber of recovery days in the hospital, and the follow-up tests-are  not re- 
imbursed separately. 
In the DRG system, therefore, heart attack patients will be classified into 
one of four DRG groups: those medically managed only (without any sur- 
gical procedures), those who receive cardiac catheterization but not bypass 
surgery or angioplasty, those who receive bypass surgery, and those who 
receive angi~plasty.~  The incentives of this system are therefore relatively 
strong to perform surgery but weak to perform additional nonsurgical care 
in hospitals. 
In the private sector, reimbursement is more variable. Some physicians 
are paid on a fee-for-service basis, although usually one where the pay- 
ments are substantially less generous than they were formally. More com- 
mon is for physicians to be paid on a salary basis or by full or partial cap- 
itation. Hospital payments are generally along the lines of Medicare, with 
a payment per admission (using the DRG system) or per day of care re- 
ceived (a per diem system). In the latter methodology, the payment does 
not vary with the services provided in each day. Thus, intensive care in the 
stay is discouraged, while marginal days of care are not so heavily penal- 
ized. For both hospitals and physicians, the rate of payment is generally 
lower in the private sector than in Medicare. As a result, the incentives for 
limited service provision are even stronger. 
2.3.1  Evidence on Reimbursement Incentives 
How much do these incentives matter? A large literature has examined 
the response of services provided to physician payment incentives (see Cut- 
ler and Zeckhauser [2000] for a summary). The issue is complicated be- 
cause the incentives of patients may be different from those of physicians: 
doctors may have incentives to provide less care, but patients may want 
5. There is a little variation in these groups between patients with complications and those 
who do not have complications, but this is based on diagnoses of the patient, not treatments 
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more. The equilibrium in such a situation is unclear. Still, the literature 
shows unambiguously that reimbursement incentives do affect the amount 
of medical care provided. 
The strongest evidence for this effect comes from work of Mark Mc- 
Clellan (1997), based on the experience of the Medicare program. McClel- 
lan looked at how surgical and nonsurgical hospital admissions changed 
after the PPS was implemented. Recall that surgery increases the DRG 
payment the hospital receives; thus, surgical admissions should rise after 
PPS. Nonsurgical admissions were predicted to fall, however, because the 
elimination of fee-for-service reimbursement made those admissions less 
generous. 
Figure 2.7 shows admission rates for surgical and nonsurgical admis- 
sions before and after the implementation of PPS. The results strikingly 
confirm the theory. Admissions for nonsurgical patients fell substantially 
with the implementation of PPS; the decline was about 40 percent. Surgi- 
cal admissions rose by nearly the same percent. The timing of this change 
is perfectly coincident with PPS. 
Evidence from managed care in the private sector shows major reduc- 
tions in hospitalization  rates and lengths of hospital stay in response to 
those incentives (Glied 2000). Admission rates in managed care plans are 
well below rates in fee-for-service plans, and lengths of hospital stay are 
shorter as well. The total saving in hospital care is about 20 percent. Some 
of this difference  is certainly due to reimbursement incentives, although di- 
rect regulations on use of care (described in the next section) are impor- 
tant, too. 
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Fig. 2.7 
Source: McClellan (1997). 
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tially less generous in payment for care in the past two decades, and this has 
affected the care provided. 
2.4  Access Rules 
Access rules are among the most complex areas of medical care. There 
are myriad varieties of medical services that can be provided, with differ- 
ent rules for each. For example, patients may have different access to pri- 
mary care, mental health specialists, and orthopedists. We synthesize the 
access rules in three parts. The set of services covered by insurance is the 
first element. Are prescription medications covered by the policy? We dis- 
cussed variations in coverage previously. We focus here on two other parts 
of access: financial payments that individuals have to make when they use 
care (termed cost sharing) and nonfinancial barriers to the use of services. 
2.4.1  Cost Sharing in Insurance 
All insurance policies require patients to pay something when they ac- 
cess care. Cost sharing evolved as a way to limit moral hazard-excessive 
use of medical services only because they are insured. Since its beginnings, 
cost sharing has become much more elaborate. 
Traditionally, private insurance policies had a varying schedule of pa- 
tient payments. A typical private schedule is shown in figure 2.8. The de- 
ductible is the amount that a patient paid before insurance covered any 
care. A typical insurance policy had a deductible of about $500. After the 
deductible, costs were split between the insurer and the enrollee. The share 
of enrollee payments is termed the coinsurance rate; a standard coinsur- 
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reached a specified maximum, termed the stop-loss. Past this point, the in- 
surer would pay all the costs of medical care. A common stop-loss was 
about $1,500. 
The optimal insurance policy balances risk sharing against moral haz- 
ard. Making individuals pay more for medical care reduces the amount of 
moral hazard. But it also increases the financial risk that people are ex- 
posed to. In the optimal policy, these gains and losses are equal at the mar- 
gin-a  small increase in coinsurance rates leads to as much loss from in- 
creased risk as it brings in benefits from reduced moral hazard. 
In practice, the tax system subsidized generous insurance and thus tilted 
policies toward being overly generous (Feldstein  1973). Employer pay- 
ments for health insurance are not counted as income for tax purposes, 
while individual payments are. It was noted in the preceding that this pro- 
vides incentives for people to have employer-based policies rather than in- 
dividual policies. In addition, it encourages running as much money as 
possible through insurance rather than leaving costs to be paid for out-of- 
pocket, as insured services are paid for with pretax dollars rather than 
posttax dollars. This leads to a welfare loss-too  little moral hazard and 
not enough risk sharing. 
A substantial literature has examined the impact of this tax subsidy on 
overall medical spending and the losses to the economy. Martin Feldstein 
pioneered these calculations in the 1970s, and since then others have pur- 
sued this line of analysis (see, e.g., Enthoven  1993). Determining a final 
value for the impact of the tax subsidy on spending is complex, as the chain 
of causal events is long. The tax subsidy influences the structure of insur- 
ance policies, which in turn affects how much care people use and, thus, 
medical spending. A consensus estimate is that total medical spending is 
perhaps 5 to 10 percent higher as a result of the tax subsidy (Cutler 2002bj. 
The traditional Medicare program has the opposite problem. Cost shar- 
ing in the Medicare system is very high, particularly for catastrophic ex- 
penses. It was already noted that Medicare does not cover outpatient pre- 
scription medications, leading beneficiaries to face substantial risk. In 
addition, cost sharing for the set of covered services is high. 
Table 2.4 shows the cost-sharing provisions in Medicare in detail, and 
figure 2.8 shows the schedule of payments for a typical  Benefi- 
ciaries who use outpatient services have a deductible of $100 and a 20 per- 
cent coinsurance rate above that. The $100 deductible is not particularly 
large, but the coinsurance occurs without limit. This exposes Medicare 
beneficiaries to substantial risk-far  more than in the private sector. Hos- 
pital cost sharing is also perverse. Medicare beneficiaries face a deductible 
equal to one day of hospital care, about $800 currently. This is very high by 
6. We assume the person has one hospitalization during the year and no laboratory tests or 
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Table 2.4  Cost sharing in Medicare, 2002 
Service  Beneficiary cost 
Part A 
Inpatient hospital 




Outpatient hospital care 
Ambulatory surgical 
Laboratory services 
Outpatient mental health 
Preventive services 
Part B 
Parts A and B 
Home health 
First stay in benejt period 
$840 deductible for first stay 
$210 per day cost sharing for days 61-90 
Reserve days 160 lifetime) 
$420 per day cost sharing for lifetime reserve days 
No cost sharing for first 20 days 
$105 per day cost sharing for days 21-100 
No coverage after 100 days 
Nominal payment for drugs and respite care 
$100 per year 
20 percent coinsurance rate 
20 percent coinsurance rate based on median charge index 
20 percent of Medicare-approved amount 
None 
50 percent coinsurance of Medicare-approved amount 
20 percent coinsurance of approved amounts, waived for 
some services 
None 
Source: Hackbarth (2003) 
private standards. After the deductible is paid, Medicare pays for the entire 
amount for the next sixty days of care. Beyond the sixty-day window, ben- 
eficiaries face increasing amounts of cost sharing for the next thirty days 
and then no further government reimb~rsement,~  again exposing benefici- 
aries to large financial risk. By  any calculation, the traditional Medicare 
program leaves people with far more financial risk than is optimal. 
In response to this high degree of risk bearing, it is natural for Medicare 
beneficiaries to want more coverage than Medicare provides. For the low- 
income population, Medicaid provides this additional insurance, paying 
for the cost sharing required by  the perverse Medicare reimbursement 
schedule. 
The higher income population does not qualify for Medicaid but re- 
ceives supplemental coverage in other ways. Some employers provide re- 
tiree health benefits that pay for the cost sharing required by  Medicare. 
Others purchase individual insurance policies that supplement Medicare, 
termed Medigup insurance. Still others enroll in HMOs, which have lower 
cost sharing. All told, about three-quarters of the elderly have some sup- 
plemental insurance, through Medicaid or private supplements. 
7. People do  have sixty lifetime reserve days that they can use. Cost sharing in those days is 
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Both employer and individual supplements provide first-dollar cover- 
age-there  is generally no cost sharing for hospital or physician services. 
The reason why first-dollar coverage is the norm is subtle. First-dollar cov- 
erage clearly leads to moral hazard. But a lot of the additional utilization 
is paid for by the traditional Medicare program, not the supplemental in- 
surance. A beneficiary that goes to the doctor more as a result of having 
supplemental insurance pays for only 20 percent of the additional use in 
the insurance premium; the remaining 80 percent is covered by Medicare. 
As a result, the cost of Medicare is much higher than it would be with- 
out supplemental insurance. Estimates suggest that people who have sup- 
plemental insurance cost Medicare about 20 percent more than they would 
without  supplemental  coverage  (Christensen  and  Shinogle  1997).  Of 
course, a better number to know is the additional spending beyond what 
Medicare would optimally spend if it were configured with the most ap- 
propriate degree of cost sharing. Because the optimal policy is more gen- 
erous than the current policy, the savings from the optimal policy are lower. 
There are no estimates of these savings, however. 
2.4.2  Nonfinancial Restrictions 
All insurance plans impose some nonfinancial barriers to access medical 
care. People need physician approval before they can receive prescription 
medications or be admitted to a hospital, for example. But some plans have 
additional barriers to the use of care. 
In the Medicare program, there are essentially no barriers to the use of 
care. Patients can see whatever doctor they want at whatever time they 
want. Referrals are not required, and no providers are out of bounds.8 This 
led to an era of substantial increase in services provided. Recently, reim- 
bursement has moved away from a pure fee-for-service basis into a more 
capitated basis, providing some incentives for doctors to do less. But the 
patient side is still very generous. 
There are substantially more barriers to receipt of care in private insur- 
ance. The most important barriers are in managed care plans. Managed 
care was noted in passing earlier, but is particularly relevant at this point. 
We provide a taxonomy of managed care in table 2.5. 
The most limited managed care arrangement is a managed indemnity in- 
surance policy. It bundles a traditional indemnity policy with some utiliza- 
tion review-monitoring  of providers to restrict the services that are per- 
formed and deny or reduce payment. For example, many insurance plans 
require that nonemergency hospital admissions be precertified. Utilization 
8. This presents an  interesting contrast with the extent of cost sharing, which was noted pre- 
viously to be very high. If the traditional system were all that people had, there would be con- 
flicts between people who want to spend less and doctors with incentives to do  more. Because 
so many people have supplemental insurance, however, there is little restraint on care from 
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Table 2.5  Key characteristics of insurance policies 
Managed care 
Indemnity  IPA/Network  GrouplS  taff 
Dimension  insurance  PPO  HMO  HMO 
Qualified providers  Almost all  Almost all  Network  Network 
Choice of providers  Patient  Patient  Gatekeeper  Gatekeeper 
(in network)  (in network) 
Payment of providers  Fee-for-service  Discounted FFS  Capitation  Salary 
Cost sharing  Moderate  Low in network;  Low in network;  Low in networ 
High out of network  High out of network  High/all out 01 
network 
(network) 
Roles of insurer  Pay bills  Pay bills;  Pay bills;  Provide care 
Form network  Form network; 
Monitor 
utilization 
Limits on utilization  Demand-side  Supply side (price)  Supply side  Supple side 
(price, quantity)  (price, quantit: 
Source: Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000). 
review can be conducted on an individual basis, as in tissue review com- 
mittees or on a statistical basis, by  monitoring a physician or hospital’s 
overall utilization. As figure 2.9 shows, managed indemnity insurance, 
though nonexistent in 1980, claimed a 41 percent share of private insur- 
ance coverage by  1992. The share has fallen to 22 percent today. 
Preferred provider organizations (PPOs), a second type of  managed 
care, form a network of providers, including physicians, hospitals, phar- 
maceutical companies, and others, and control costs by securing discounts 
from them. The quid pro quo for the discounted fee is that insured partic- 
ipants  are  steered to  in-network providers.  Out-of-network  providers 
may get reduced coverage on a limited basis (with higher cost sharing, for 
example) or may not be covered at all. In 1991, the typical PPO had an 
in-network coinsurance rate of  10 percent and an out-of-network coin- 
surance  rate  of  20  percent.  PPOs  usually  impose  preauthorization 
requirements as well, though they are rarely especially strict. As figure 2.9 
shows, PPO enrollment, zero in 1980, now makes up about one-quarter of 
the privately insured population. 
Full integration creates the strongest link between insurance and provi- 
sion. In the United States, these merged entities are called HMOs. There 
are two major types of HMOs. Within a group or staff HMO-the  most 
common form, with Kaiser being the best-known example-physicians 
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Fig. 2.9  Changes in private health plan enrollment 
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hospitals on contract or may operate its own hospital. Independent prac- 
tice associations (IPAs), or network model HMOs, represent a more recent 
innovation in managed care.9  These plans neither employ their own physi- 
cians nor run their own hospitals. Instead, they contract with providers in 
the community. 
Health maintenance organizations employ a range of mechanisms to 
limit utilization. They reflect the traditional economic instruments of reg- 
ulation, incentives, and selection of types. Health maintenance organiza- 
tions frequently regulate physicians’ practices, for example, limiting the re- 
ferrals they can make or the tests they can order. In addition, there are 
financial incentives for physicians in HMOs to do less, as noted earlier. 
Moreover, HMOs monitor the services that physicians provide. They may 
reward parsimonious resource use directly with compensation, though 
more likely with perks or subsequent promotion. Extravagant users are 
kicked out of the network. Finally, because physicians differ substantially 
in their treatment philosophies, HMOs can select physicians whose natu- 
ral inclination is toward conservative treatment. 
In some HMOs, patients can go outside of the network and still receive 
some reimbursement. This is termed a point of service (POS) option. But re- 
imbursement out-of-network is not as generous as reimbursement within. 
Use of nonnetwork services, for example, frequently requires a deductible 
followed by a 10 to 40 percent coinsurance payment. 
9. Some IPAs are older, but that form gained popularity only recently. 64  David M. Cutler and David A. Wise 
The sweeping nature of insurer-provider interactions is indicated by fig- 
ure 2.9 (see also Glied 2000). In 1980, over 90 percent of the privately in- 
sured population in the United States was covered by unmanaged indem- 
nity insurance. By  1996, that share had shrunk to a mere 3 percent. Health 
maintenance organization enrollment of all forms (including POS enroll- 
ment) has increased from 8 percent of the population  in 1980 (then pre- 
dominantly group- or staff-model enrollment) to nearly half of the pri- 
vately insured population today. 
In exchange for tight access restrictions, most HMOs have very low 
patient cost sharing. A person might face a $10 copayment for seeing a net- 
work physician, compared to full price for the first dollar of care in some 
indemnity insurance plans. 
2.4.3 
Managed care clearly reduces utilization of some types of care. Man- 
aged care plans have a higher ratio of primary care physicians to special- 
ists than do  nonmanaged care plans (Glied 2000). In addition, nonnetwork 
providers are much less likely to be seen than are network providers. Per- 
haps most significantly, however, these requirements allow for substan- 
tially lower prices paid for medical care. Exact data on prices in different 
insurance arrangements is not known, but it is not uncommon to find dis- 
counts of 30 percent on physician and hospital care for insurance plans 
with tight networks. These price reductions are a major reason why man- 
aged care plans cost less than traditional indemnity insurance plans (Alt- 
man, Cutler, and Zeckhauser 2003). 
Further, the evidence does not suggest large adverse effects of managed 
care on health outcomes. Some studies find that patients are worse off, 
some find that they are better off, and most find that they are about the 
same. Summary reviews of the literature suggest no outcome differences 
between managed care and traditional insurance policies (Miller and Luft 
1997). 
Even with this profile--cost  savings and no adverse impact on health- 
managed care is not very popular. Utilization review is the aspect of med- 
icine that physicians dislike the most. Doctors feel their professional in- 
tegrity is challenged by these restrictions and have protested vehemently. 
Patients do not like managed care either, in large part because of the per- 
ception that managed care restricts the care they can receive. The wide- 
spread interest in a Patient’s Bill of Rights is testament to this concern. As 
a result of physician and patient opposition, the extent of utilization review 
has changed over time. Where utilization review was common in the early 
199Os, it is rarer now. Instead, managed care plans have substituted more 
financial incentives (such as capitation) to encourage physicians to provide 
less care. 
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2.4.4  Comparisons with Other Countries 
The specific form of  utilization review as we  have described is  most 
prevalent in the United  States. But restrictions on utilization  are wide- 
spread throughout the developed world. In most countries, utilization is 
restricted through overall limits on the availability of medical services. 
Canada, for example, imposes very tight controls on the number of hospi- 
tals that can acquire expensive new technologies. There is less technology 
than physicians would use by  choice, so some rationing must occur. In 
practice, the rationing is done by physicians, who decide which patients 
most need access to the technologies. 
The distinction between physician-driven rationing and insurer-driven 
rationing is fundamental in some ways but less important in others. Physi- 
cians are certainly happier with physician-driven rationing than with in- 
surer-driven rationing, as they make the decisions in one case but have 
decisions imposed on them in  the  other. From the social perspective, 
however, both methods ration access to medical care. The empirical issue 
is whether that rationing works well and how much rationing is appropri- 
ate. International comparisons of medical care provided under different in- 
surance arrangements should help to answer this question. 
2.5  Conclusion 
Because medical care systems are complex, they cannot be easily char- 
acterized. Still, some dimensions of organization are apparent. In this pa- 
per, we highlight three important domains of medical care: the rules about 
coverage, reimbursement between insurers and providers, and access to 
care. 
While there is variability within the United States, we  suggest the fol- 
lowing simple summary. Coverage in the United States is spotty-quite 
good for the elderly, especially those with supplemental insurance, but not 
guaranteed for the nonelderly. Historically, reimbursement of  providers 
was very generous, and access was open as well. Increasingly, though, the 
reimbursement and access routes are being restricted as insurers respond 
to moral hazard and the demand for cost containment. 
The direction the medical system will go in the United States is not clear. 
Even in the past few years, reimbursement and access rules have changed, 
and coverage issues have dominated the public agenda. Changes along all 
three dimensions bear watching. 
It is also important to extend this analysis to other countries. One of the 
central issues in all of health economics is determining which medical sys- 
tem is best. Only by  characterizing existing systems and comparing out- 
comes across countries can we make progress in this effort. 66  David M. Cutler and David A. Wise 
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